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MOVING TOWARDS A NOMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT? CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SHIFT
FROM JUDICIAL ACTIVISM TO CONSTITUTIONAL
IRRELEVANCE IN TAIWAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS
Ming-Sung Kuo †
Abstract:
The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC, also known as the
Council of Grand Justices) has been regarded as a central player in Taiwan’s transition to
democracy in the late twentieth century. Transforming from a rubberstamp under the
authoritarian regime into a facilitator of political dispute settlement, the TCC channelled
volatile political forces into its jurisdiction. Thanks to the TCC’s judicial activism, the
judicialization of constitutional politics was characteristic of Taiwan’s democratization in
the last two decades of the twentieth century. The TCC scholarship asserts that the TCC
has continued to play a pivotal role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics in the twenty-first
century. Taking issue with this popular view, this article focuses on twenty-first century
TCC case law to argue that Taiwan’s constitutional politics has moved towards
de-judicialization as the TCC has gradually turned away from judicial activism in the
face of escalating constitutional conflicts. With the TCC retreating from constitutional
politics, this article argues that its constitutional jurisdiction is becoming nominal with
the Constitution losing its grip on politics again.

I.

INTRODUCTION: JUDICIALIZATION OF TAIWAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The role of courts of law in new democracies is one of the most
discussed subjects in scholarship on democratic transition and comparative
judicial politics. There is disagreement, however, on what that role is and
how much power courts in new democracies actually wield. Some scholars
point to the fact that dormant, subservient courts awakened to calls for the
rule of law and helped democratic movements by reining in state power of
authoritarian regimes through judicial rulings; 1 others note the installation
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1
See, e.g., JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–2000 219–39, 315–19 (2008); Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional
Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation, 3 J. COMP. L. 80, 82–83 (2008).
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of nascent courts in post-authoritarian politics as a means of consolidating
constitutional democracy. 2 In terms of this juxtaposition, the story of the
TCC 3 straddles the line between resurgence and nascence in the study of the
judicial role in democratic transition.4 On one hand, the resurgent TCC
noticeably morphed into the facilitator of democratic transition in the early
1990s, even though it had previously rubberstamped the policies of the
Kuomintang (KMT, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party) party-state
regime before.5 On the other hand, like nascent courts installed during
democratic transitions in other countries, the TCC has been praised as a
guardian of Taiwan’s new democracy since the 1996 popular presidential
election, 6 which paved the way for the country’s first majority ruling party
change when Mr. Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the
independence-inclined Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was elected
President.7
It should be noted that the TCC did not play its facilitator-guardian
role in its own right at the height of Taiwan’s transition to democracy during
the last two decades of the twentieth century. The TCC’s transformation
into a facilitator and guardian of democracy began during a period of
fundamental constitutional revision in Taiwan.8 From 1991 to 2000, there

2
See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 85–91. See generally MATTHEW C. INGRAM, CRAFTING
COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF SUBNATIONAL JUDICIAL REFORM IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO
(2015); WOJCIEC SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2014); Theunis Roux, Constitutional
Courts as Democratic Consolidators: Insights from South Africa After 20 Years, 42 J. S. AFR. STUD. 5
(2016).
3
For the jurisdiction, organization, and procedures of the TCC, see Wen-Chen Chang, The Role of
Judicial Review in Consolidating Democracy: The Case of Taiwan, 2 ASIA L. REV. 73 (2005) [hereinafter
Wen-Chen Chang, The Case of Taiwan]; Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan:
Gradual Transformations towards the Guardian of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS
IN CONTEXT 143, 148–49, 155–56 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2015) [hereinafter Wen-Chen
Chang, Gradual Transformations].
4
For an examination of a constitutional court transitioning from a democratic to an authoritarian
system, see Eric C. Ip, The Politics of Constitutional Common Law in Hong Kong Under Chinese
Sovereignty, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 565 (2016).
5
See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 82–84.
6
See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 169–72.
7
This article follows the convention in the press that places the Chinese surname before the first
name when referring to Taiwanese politicians.
8
See generally Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of Fatung: Representational Manipulation and
Reconstruction in Taiwan, in THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION 23 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of
Fatung].
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were six rounds of constitutional revision 9 aimed at reforming the externally
imposed Chinese Constitution of 1947 (the Constitution) to fit the emerging
island-nation of Taiwan.10 Moreover, the TCC’s transformation was not
only synchronized with the democratic driving forces of constitutional
reform, but was also an activist institutional player in the theatre of
constitutional politics. 11 Continuously steering the interrelationship among
other constitutional powers within the political branch via a series of
constitutional interpretations,12 the TCC defied the conventional wisdom
that courts should avoid such high politics. 13 Instead of involving itself in
the political vortex to the detriment of its independence and institutional
integrity, the TCC emerged as the principal arbitrator of disputes between
other constitutional powers.14 For example, in December 1996, the TCC
thwarted the political will of President Lee Teng-hui, who had just won a
landslide victory in the first presidential election by popular vote early that
year, by essentially declaring unconstitutional the retention of his then-heir
apparent Vice President Lien Chan for the Premiership of the Administration
(Executive Yuan) in Interpretation No. 419. 15

9

The Constitution was revised again in 2005, which was the last time it has been amended.
See Ming-Sung Kuo, W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness? Besieged Democratic Legitimacy Under
the Extraconstitutional Hybrid Regulation across the Taiwan Strait, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 221, 227–30
(2011) (referring to the changed constitutional provision, this article adopts the more popular term
“amendment” in place of the official designation “additional article”) [hereinafter Ming-Sung Kuo,
W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness?].
11
See Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutions and Values in Three Chinese Societies, in AN INQUIRY INTO
THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES: THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119,
126–27 (Dennis Davis et al. eds., 2015).
12
See Ming-Sung Kuo (悕所㜦), Wei Xian Shen Cha Ji Zhi Jie Jue Zheng Zhi Jiang Ju Ke Neng
Xing zhi Ping Gu: Yi Si Fa Yuan Da Fa Guan Zhen Dui Zheng Zhi Bu Men Quan Xian Zheng Yi zhi Jie Shi
Wei Zhong Xin (忽ㅚ⮑㞍㨇⇞妋㰢㓧㱣⯨⎗傥⿏ᷳ姽Ộ烉ẍ⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀憅⮵㓧㱣悐攨㪲旸䇕嬘ᷳ
妋慳䁢ᷕ⽫) [Judicial Review as a Solution to Political Gridlocks? A Study of Taiwan’s Grand Justices
Council Interpretations Regarding the Jurisdictional Disputes within the Political Branch], 30 TAI DA FA
XUE LUN CONG (⎘⣏㱽⬠婾⎊) [NAT’L. TAIWAN U.L.J.] 251, 251–89 (2001) [hereinafter Ming-Sung
Kuo, Judicial Review].
13
See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 60–170 (1980). Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–243 (1986).
14
See Kuo, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 281–35.
15
J.Y. Interpretation No. 419 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=419 (I use “Interpretation” rather than “J.Y. Interpretation” to refer to a TCC
official ruling. It is true that the TCC stopped short of invalidating Mr. Lien’s Premiership. Yet, it is not
out of the question that this proved what Jiunn-rong Yeh calls the TCC’s deference to President
Lee.). Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and the Judicial Facilitation of Dialogue between Political
Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean and Taiwanese Experiences, 8 INT’L J.
10
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Yet the foremost example of the TCC’s activist approach to
constitutional politics was its handling of the so-called unconstitutional
constitutional amendments.16 In March 2000, just days after Mr. Chen was
elected President, the TCC declared the fifth round of constitutional
revisions unconstitutional and thus null and void, despite the absence of a
so-called eternity clause in the Constitution. 17 What made Interpretation No.
499 intriguing was that the all-powerful National Assembly, which had final
say on constitutional revision until then and had passed the impugned
constitutional amendments, inflicted no severe vengeance on the TCC in the

CONST. L. 911, 933 (2010) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics]. See also WEN-CHEN
CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (2014) (discussing the obscurity
of Interpretation No. 419 but without noting the TCC’s “non-conformity” statement) [hereinafter
WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA]. Specifically, expecting the TCC’s ruling, Lee
convened a round table talk from December 23 to 28, 1996, which was aimed at giving the president the
unilateral appointment power over the Premiership, among other things, in the next round of constitutional
revision. Instead of defying the TCC’s “non-conformity” declaration to the effect that his retention of Mr.
Lien for the Premiership was “not . . . completely in conformity with the Constitution,” Lee simply carried
out the conclusion of the foregoing bipartisan meeting in the fourth round of constitutional revision in
1997. Notably, equipped with the new unilateral appointment power, Lee appointed a new Premier instead
of retaining Lien, a clear concession to the TCC’s entreaty that the dispute be dealt with “in accordance
with the ruling” that the retention “will not be completely in conformity with the Constitution.” A note on
my English rendering of the TCC case law is due. Unless directly quoted, all English renderings in this
article are mine to make them more readable.
16
The question of unconstitutional constitutional amendments has recently resurfaced in
constitutional scholarship, especially in English-language works. See, e.g., Richard Albert,
Nonconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 22 CAN. J. L & JURIS. 1 (2009); Aharon Barak,
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISRAEL L. REV. 321 (2011); Yaniv Roznai, The Theory
and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557
(2013); Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606 (2015). Yet it has long been
theoretically contemplated among constitutional lawyers in civil law jurisdictions as well as in Common
law countries. See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150–53 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,
2008); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 169–72 (1993). Under the influence of
German constitutional theories, Taiwanese constitutional scholars had already written prolifically on the
various issues surrounding unconstitutional constitutional amendments even when Taiwan was still under
the martial-law rule. See, e.g., Ming-Sung Kuo (悕所㜦), Cong Xian Fa Xiu Zheng Tiao Wen zhi Ke Si Fa
Xing Lun Zheng Zhi Wen Ti Bu Shen Cha Yuan Ze: Yi Mei Guo Lian Bang Xian Fa Di Er Shi Qi Zeng Bu
Tiao Kuan Wei Li (⽆ㅚ㱽ᾖ㬋㡅㔯ᷳ⎗⎠㱽⿏婾㓧㱣⓷柴ᶵ⮑㞍⍇⇯--ẍ伶⚳倗恎ㅚ㱽䫔Ḵ⋩ᶫ⡆
墄㡅㫦䁢ἳ) [On the Constitutionality of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: An
Analysis of the Political Question Doctrine and the Justiciability of Constitutional Amendments], 23 XIAN
ZHENG SHI DAI (ㅚ㓧㗪ẋ) [CONST. REV.] 1, 1 (1998).
17
Unlike some countries whose constitutions include the clause that contains explicit restrictions on
the substance of constitutional amendment, namely the eternity clause, the Constitution of 1947 provides
for no such explicit restriction. See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 170. For
a discussion on the eternity clause, see Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses:” The
German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429 (2011).
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wake of this constitutional blow. 18 Instead, the National Assembly
responded with a sixth round of constitutional revisions that virtually
rendered itself defunct, a long-pursued goal of constitutional reform
considered unachievable due to its exclusive power to approve bills of
constitutional amendment. 19
In a word, Taiwan’s experience with
democratic transition in the late twentieth century both reflected a broad
trend towards the judicialization of politics in new democracies and
indicated judicial activism in constitutional politics.20
In this light, the TCC has been seen not only as an activist court, but
also as a normative one in two respects: first, as a court, its rulings have
been faithfully observed by other constitutional powers and political parties
and it has effectively settled politically charged disputes; 21 and second, as
the ordained interpreter of the Constitution, it has helped change Taiwan’s
“semantic” constitution into a “normative” order with its interpretations.22

18
But see Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 171–72. Notably, the TCC
was not affected as an institution even though the sequel constitutional revision of April 2000 provided that
justices be treated differentially: those coming from the judicial corps of career judges and prosecutors
would receive a better pension plan under Amendment 5, Section 1. See also Po Jen Yap, Constitutional
Fig Leaves in Asia, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 421, 441 (2016).
19
The defunct National Assembly was not completely abolished until the seventh and last round of
constitutional revision in 2005, when the power to approve bills of constitutional amendment was placed in
the hands of the electorate through referendum. See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ASIA, supra note 15, at 297.
20
See Wen-Chen Chang, The Case of Taiwan, supra note 3. For a discussion on the role of strong
judicial review in post-communist central and eastern Europe, see generally RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW
AFTER COMMUNISM (Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005).
21
See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 177. A terminological
clarification is due. Formally speaking, the TCC’s decision takes the form of interpretation. As its
interpretations result from referrals or petitions prompted by constitutional disputes, the TCC effectively
rules on disputes through interpretations. For purposes of elegance and simplicity, this article uses
“interpretation,” “ruling,” “judgment,” and “decision” interchangeably when referring to TCC case law.
22
Karl Loewenstein, a German émigré and Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at
Amherst, classified constitutions into three ideal types: normative, nominal, and semantic. A constitution is
“normative” not only for its reflection of the values of constitutional democracy in content but also for the
implementation of its content in practice. In contrast, if a constitution reflects the values of constitutional
democracy in content only but is unenforced, Loewenstein called it “nominal.” “Semantic” constitutions
are the most intriguing in Loewenstein’s tripartite classification. Unlike nominal constitutions, there is no
discrepancy between content and practice in semantic constitutions. Yet the content of semantic
constitutions simply reflects the political will of dictators, making mockery of constitutionalism. The
“constitutional” documents of the Fascist/Nazi regimes in the interwar period are Loewenstein’s examples
of semantic constitutions. See KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
147–53 (1957). Notably, prior to the first round of constitutional revision in 1991, Taiwan was governed
by the so-called Temporary Provisions, which were enacted in accordance with the Constitution’s
amendment clause, alongside part of the Constitution that was not suspended (or rather replaced) by the
former. Also noteworthy is that Temporary Provisions were not formally incorporated into the
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Judicial activism and the making of a normative constitutional order seem to
have developed simultaneously, which has been the focus of scholarship on
the TCC. 23 Simply put, the constitutional order in post-authoritarian
Taiwan has taken on the character of “judicial constitutionalism.” 24
Focusing either on the unchanged institutional features of the TCC or on the
number of statutes and regulations it has struck down, the popular view held
by TCC scholars maintains that the TCC has carried over its glorious record
of the twentieth century into its operation in the twenty-first century. 25
This article takes issue with the assumed continuation of the TCC’s activist
and normative role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics at the core of this
upbeat view.
Against this optimistic image of judicial politics portrayed in much of
the TCC scholarship, this article argues that the TCC’s role in Taiwan’s
constitutional politics has been substantially curtailed since
2000. Analyzing TCC case law from 2000 to 2016, 26 this article will
demonstrate that the TCC’s importance and influence has continuously
shrunk during this period. This trend began with the intensified partisan
rivalry between the KMT-dominated Pan Blue group and the DPP-led Pan
Green camp during President Chen’s tenure, followed by the KMT’s

Constitution. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 113–15 (2003); John Garver, Introduction: Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation, in
TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 1, 19 (Robert Ash et al. eds., 2011). As
Temporary Provisions embodied the will of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of the values of
constitutional democracy embraced by the Constitution, Taiwan’s pre-1991 constitutional order evokes
what Loewenstein called a semantic constitution. See, e.g., Chang Chia-Yin (⻝▱⯡), Taiwan Xian Fa
Bian Qian de Xian Fa Xue Kao Cha (冢䀋ㅚ㱽嬲怟䘬ㅚ㱽⬠侫⮇) [Constitutional Change in Taiwan: A
Constitutional Theoretical Perspective], 3 TAIWAN MIN ZHU JI KAN ( 冢 䀋 㮹 ᷣ ⬋ ↲ ) [TAIWAN
DEMOCRACY Q.] 129, 129–64 (2006).
23
See, e.g., Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 169–72; Jou-Jou Chu,
Global Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism in Taiwan, 38 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 515 (2008); Tom
Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 771–73 (2008).
24
See Mark Tushnet, The Relationship Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial
Review, 14 GER. L.J. 2249, 2250, 2250 n.1 (2013).
25
See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 944; Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen
Chang, A Decade of Changing Constitutionalism in Taiwan: Transitional and Transnational Perspectives,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 167–68 (Albert H.Y. Chen
ed., 2014). Cf. Jau-Yuan Hwang, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court from 2003 to 2011: New Appointments
and Different Performance, 53 SEOUL L.J. 41, 51–62 (2013).
26
So far only two interpretations (Interpretations No. 735 and 736) have been promulgated in 2016.
Interpretation No. 736 concerned the right of school teachers and university lecturers to judicial remedy
while the parliamentary motion of no confidence was at the core of Interpretation No. 735. This article will
further discuss Interpretation No. 735 in infra Part II.B.
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triumphant return to power in 2008. 27 Although both the legally defined
jurisdiction of the TCC and the institutional guarantee of its independence
remained unchanged,28 its rulings failed to settle crucial political disputes
when the Pan Blue and the Pan Green were engaged in a political zero-sum
game during the DPP’s eight-year reign. Later on, the reconstituted TCC
retreated from the activist role of its predecessor and became its recent
embodiment of being a reluctant player in constitutional politics. Acting
with judicial self-restraint, the TCC was sidelined in the arena of
constitutional politics after the second party turnover in 2008. As a whole,
even though the TCC has continued to hear important constitutional issues in
the twenty-first century, its normative role has declined. Using Karl
Loewenstein’s noted distinction between normative and nominal
constitutions as an analogy, 29 this article argues that the TCC has latently
turned away from its role as an activist and normative facilitator-guardian of
constitutionalism, devolving into a nominal court in the midst of
ever-increasing political conflicts. Paralleling the TCC’s tendency towards
de-judicialization, Taiwan appears to have retreated from judicial
constitutionalism in favour of a breed of constitutional politics unguided by
the Constitution through judicial interpretation, thereby casting doubt on the
stability of its constitutional order.
A note on the article’s methodology is necessary before turning to
case law analysis. Departing from conventional approaches to studying
judicial performance in new democracies, which tend to focus on how many
rulings (or rather, rulings of unconstitutionality) a court has delivered,
especially in the area of fundamental rights,30 this article engages in a “thick
description” of the TCC rulings that concern politically charged
issues. Under this analysis, each case will be closely inspected in light of its

27
The KMT continued to hold the majority seats of the Parliament (Legislative Yuan) and the
Presidency in the 2012 elections.
28
In retaliation for Interpretation No. 585, in early 2005 the Pan Blue-controlled Parliament
attempted to cut off the judicial premium from the emolument paid to the TCC Justices by non-statutory
means. In this ruling, the TCC effectively set aside the first statute governing the special parliamentary
committee, which was tasked with the investigation into the so-called 3/19 Incident. This seemingly
pecuniary dispute was considered a shot across the bow, calling the TCC’s judicial character into
doubt. The impugned non-statutory means was soon struck down in Interpretation No. 601 (2005). This
article will further discuss the constitutional controversies generated by the 3/19 Incident in infra Part
II.A.2.
29
See Loewenstein, supra note 22.
30
See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why Courts Can Be More
Democratic Than Parliaments, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 20, at 25.
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pre-referral, post-referral, and post-promulgation political context for three
reasons.31 First, in light of the TCC’s past record of using interpretations to
settle political disputes, which “bootstrapped” its legitimacy in playing an
activist role to the TCC, 32 its interpretations in similar cases in recent times
may indicate its overall current performance. Second, as constitutional
comparatists have focused on the judicial branch of new democracies as they
are situated in the volatile political context of democratic transition, 33
examining the TCC case law on politically charged issues will engage the
article’s findings with this broad line of scholarship. Third, a “thick
description” assesses the effectiveness of the TCC in resolving political
disputes more effectively than a numerical study, as the former has greater
ability to tease out the intricacies of constitutional politics in a single
jurisdiction. 34
Apart from Part I, this article comprises of three parts: Part II
analyzes TCC case law from 2000 to 2016; Part III explains why
de-judicialization is concerning, as it suggests the withering of constitutional
normativity; and Part IV summarizes the article’s arguments and briefly
comments on the constitutional landscape following the presidential election
in January 2016.

31

Notably, Clifford Geertz’s method of thick description extends beyond politics to include the
whole cultural context. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of
Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3–30 (1973).
32
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Bootstrapping, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 116–17 (2012)
(defining the concept of bootstrapping). For a different application of the concept of bootstrapping to the
context of constituent assemblies, see Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 57
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
The TCC’s most representative bootstrapping interpretation is
Interpretation No. 261. See Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of Fatung, supra note 8.
33
See SADURSKI, supra note 2; GINSBURG, supra note 22; RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS:
THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160–62 (2014); see also Jiunn-rong Yeh,
supra note 14; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East Asian
Experiences, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 885 (2010) [hereinafter Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses].
34
Cf. HIRSCHL, supra note 33, at 193, 260–68 (referring to research based on “statistical analyses of
a large number of observations, measurements, data sets, etc.” as “‘large-N’ studies,” and noting that a
“large-N” study is better at analyzing “world constitutions” than a single case). To map the political
context in which the TCC case law and constitutional politics were situated, this article examines the online
archive of Taipei Times (an English-language newspaper published in Taipei, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com) for factual reports.
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DECODING THE MOVE TOWARDS DE-JUDICIALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S CASE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

To shed light on the recent tendency towards de-judicialization in
Taiwan’s constitutional politics, the article shall take a close look at TCC
case law in the twenty-first century. Section A includes a survey of the case
law during President Chen’s reign from 2000 to 2008, which indicated signs
were emerging that the TCC was losing its normative grip on constitutional
politics in the face of partisan rivalry despite its continued activism. In
Section B, the article continues to examine the case law following the
KMT’s return to power in May 2008. The article will show that the move
towards de-judicialization was completed during the second period, as the
TCC remained on the sidelines during escalating constitutional conflicts.
A.

An Activist But Failing Court in the Face of Partisan Rivalry:
2000–2008

In the period from May 20, 2000 to May 19, 2008, the TCC
promulgated a total of 135 interpretations. 35 128 (95%) of the total
interpretations
concerned
constitutional
disputes. Among
these
36
constitutional interpretations, 115 concerned fundamental rights, while 13
resulted from what this article terms “political disputes,” which either
centered on the competence of departments of constitutional powers
(especially the Presidency, the Administration, and the Parliament
(Legislative Yuan)) or affected the relationship between the central

35

This statistic excludes the nine rulings (from Interpretations No. 499 to No. 507) promulgated
prior to May 20, 2000, when President Chen was sworn in. It should be noted that the present selection of
case law is based on the date of promulgation, although this may not accurately reflect the role the TCC has
played in constitutional politics as the referral or petition may have been made to the TCC long before the
case was decided. This is due to the fact that there is no time limit for cases being decided once they are
referred or appealed to the TCC. As the present objective is to assess the role of the TCC in the
constitutional order through its case law in the twenty-first century, this article uses the TCC
interpretations promulgated during the studied period only as the point of access to analyze how they
played out in constitutional politics.
The discussion of TCC interpretations will thus extend to the
pre-and post-promulgation political context in which they were situated. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
36
It is noteworthy that many rulings on fundamental rights centered on the issue of legality rather
than on the underlying value and principle of fundamental rights concerned. See Sean Cooney, The Effects
of Rule of Law Principles in Taiwan, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 411, 421–23
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
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government and local governments. During this period, the TCC continued
with its activist approach to constitutional disputes. Although the number of
constitutional cases peaked with a historical high of thirty-four in 1994, the
TCC remained productive from 2000 to 2008, averaging sixteen
constitutional interpretations per year during this period.
Apart from its productivity, the TCC continued to play a part in the
most contentious political disputes, many of which were attributed to the
divided government of the DPP controlling the Government (or rather the
executive power comprising the Presidency and the Administration) and the
Pan Blue parties dominating the Parliament.37 As noted in the literature,
almost all conspicuous constitutional controversies were resolved into
constitutional issues. 38 Table 1 39 indicates that on average, at least one
intense partisan confrontation was brought before the TCC as a
constitutional issue in each year of President Chen’s presidency, with the
number growing during his final two years in office. Considering the time it
took for the TCC to decide a case, as well as the interval between the genesis
of a political dispute and its formal referral thereto, there was almost no
respite in the so-called “democratic civil war.” 40 Notably, in most of the
cases, the TCC did not resort to jurisdictional or procedural grounds to evade

37

Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 914, 918; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic
Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 906-07. Under the so-called semi-presidentialism, both the
President, the head of state and of Presidency, and the Premier, who leads the Administration, are vested
with the executive power in the Constitution. See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., supra note 15, at 127,
144. This article uses the term “Government” to denote the entirety of the executive power comprising the
Presidency and the Administration.
38
See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s Thesis
Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004); Ming-Sung Kuo, Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is
Judicial Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?, 26 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 341, 371–72 (2013); Ming-Sung Kuo, Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a
Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering, 23 RATIO JURIS. 390, 394 (2010). See also Ginsburg, supra
note 23, at 770–78 (addressing the case of Taiwan).
39
Among the thirteen interpretations that concerned political disputes during the studied period, two
were about the internal administration of the judicial branch (Interpretations No. 530 and No. 539), while
one was aimed at harmonizing appointment procedures for the TCC Justices in the wake of the sixth round
of constitutional revision (Interpretation No. 541). Due to their limited implications for constitutional
politics, this article leaves them out of Table 1. It should be pointed out that the case law listed in Table 1
includes all interpretations that concerned important political disputes during the period May 20, 2000 to
March 31, 2016. Ten out of the thirteen cases listed were promulgated by the end of President Chen’s
tenure.
40
Michelle Wang, Editorial, The need to fight in our “democratic civil war,” TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 24,
2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/12/24/2003393940/1.
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constitutional issues, but rather tackled them head-on. 41 Moreover, although
the TCC seemed to occasionally set out procedural guidelines for different
branches of government to work out interdepartmental disputes in the future,
the TCC never failed to take a stand on the immediate issue before it.42

41

Alex Bickel famously noted how the United States Supreme Court may adopt doctrines and
techniques to decline exercising its jurisdiction. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 127–56, 169–97.
42
But cf. Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 947–48.
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Table 1: Judicial Yuan Interpretations Concerning Important
Political Disputes May 20, 2000 – March 31, 2016 43
JY
No.

Date of
Promulgation

Date of
Referral/
Petition

Petitioner

Main Constitutional Issues

520

01/15/2001

11/10/2000

Administration

543

05/03/2002

12/27/1999

MPs

550

10/04/2002

03/25/2002

TCG

553

12/20/2002

05/08/2002

TCG

585

12/15/2004

09/15/2004

MPs (Pan
Green caucus)

601

07/22/2005

01/25/2005

MPs (Pan
Green caucus)

613

07/21/2006

01/20/2006

Administration

627

06/15/2007

01/25/2007

Presidency

632

08/15/2007

06/16/2005

633

09/28/2007

05/01/2006

645

07/11/2008

01/02/2004

729

05/012015

11/29/2013

735

02/04/2016

09/17/2012

MPs (Pan
Green caucus)
MPs (Pan
Green caucus)
MPs (Pan
Green caucus)
Administration
(SPO)
MPs (Pan
Green caucus)

Does the Administration have the unilateral power to
discontinue the construction of the Fourth Nuclear
Power Plant despite the legislatively-allocated budget
for that plan?
Does the Parliament-approved presidential emergency
decree allow for further statutory instruments issued by
the Administration?
Is it constitutional that the National Health Insurance
Act provides that local governments contribute to the
subsidy for premium payable by their registered
residents for the centrally-administered national health
insurance program?
Is it constitutional for the Administration to revoke a
TCG decision to postpone the statutorily scheduled
election of its borough wardens?
Is the Extraordinary Parliamentary Investigative
Committee (EPIC) Act, which provides the EPIC with
broad prosecutorial powers among others,
constitutional?
Can the Parliament constitutionally cut off the judicial
allowance from the TCC Justices’ remuneration in
vetting the annual government budget?
Are the NCC Act provisions concerning the NCC
formation constitutional?
What is the scope of the presidential immunity? Does
the President have a state secrets privilege under the
Constitution? If so, what is the scope of this
presidential privilege?
Is it constitutional for the Parliament not to exercise its
consent power over the appointment of ombudsmen?
Is the amended EPIC Act unconstitutional?
Is the provision in the Referendum Act concerning the
formation of the RRC constitutional?
Does the Parliament have the constitutional power to
access the dossier of criminal cases?
Are the statutory provisions that restrict the introduction
of no-confidence motions during a special
parliamentary session constitutional?

43
I compiled this information from the online official TCC case reports. See Interpretations,
JUSTICES OF THE CONST. COURT, JUD. YUAN, R.O.C, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/
p03.asp (last visited May 7, 2016). For the case reports in Chinese, see http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/p03.asp (last visited May 7, 2016).
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Interpretation No. 520 illustrates this practice of judicial
activism. The new DPP Administration referred a case to the TCC due to a
bitter battle with the KMT-dominated Parliament resulting from the
Administration’s unilateral decision to discontinue the construction of
Taiwan’s Forth Nuclear Power Plant (the Power Plant) despite a legislatively
allocated budget for its construction. The TCC suggested four possible
solutions, all of which required the challenged decision be subjected to a
parliamentary vote. 44 This decision has been interpreted as evidence of the
TCC’s strategic reliance on procedure without intervening in
substance. 45 Yet a closer look at Interpretation No. 520 suggests
otherwise. First, all of the four seemingly procedural solutions were
premised on the compulsory character of the legislatively approved annual
government budget. Even the Administration appointed by the newly
elected President Chen, who had pledged to stop the construction of the
Power Plant in his election manifesto, had no unilateral power to amend the
annual government budget by selective execution. Apart from the first
suggestion, that the Administration dutifully accept the contrary
parliamentary resolution and resume the Power Plant’s construction, the
other three solutions all led to the conclusion that the Administration had to
concede in the face of parliamentary opposition.46 This case illustrates the
TCC’s aggressive approach to resolving political disputes, holding a firm
grip on other constitutional powers.
Yet while it is one thing to say that the TCC continued to be an
activist court, it is another to conclude that the TCC remained an effective
institutional arbitrator of political disputes. To determine whether the TCC

44

J.Y. Interpretation No. 520 (Const. Ct. Jan. 15, 2001), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno= 520.
45
See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 947.
46
Under the second solution, the Premier would have to resign. Yet this does not suggest that her
replacement could disregard the parliamentary resolution concerned. Regarding the third solution, the
Parliament could further pass a motion of no confidence, forcing the President to accept the Premier’s
resignation or to dissolve the Parliament. Notably, the President could have elected to dissolve the
Parliament with the hope that the electorate would return a new Parliament in support of his election
pledge. Nevertheless, this only vindicated the binding force of the parliamentary resolution vis-à-vis the
Administration. The fourth solution went beyond the execution of the Parliament-approved annual
budget. While the Administration had no unilateral power to selectively execute the annual budget, it was
under no constitutional obligation to continue to finance the Power Plant plan in the future budget bill.
The fourth solution suggested that should the Parliament wish to see the plan, however, the Parliament
would have to provide for the completion of the Power Plant in legislation, which would compel the
Administration to carry out and finance this legal requirement. J.Y. Interpretation No. 520 (Const. Ct.
Jan. 15, 2001).

610

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

succeeded in maintaining its status as a normative court by settling political
disputes during the relevant period, this article analyzes the cases listed in
Table 1 in light of the broader political context. This article first takes up
the TCC rulings on the political disputes during Chen’s first term.
1.

Shining (Dimmer) Under Gathering Political Storm Clouds:
2000–2004

A quick look at Table 1 reveals that among the four interpretations
promulgated during President Chen’s first term, Interpretation No. 543 was
petitioned to the TCC by the Members of the Parliament (MPs, also known
as Legislators) during the former President Lee’s tenure. Although it
involved an important constitutional question concerning the exercise of the
presidential emergency power provided for in Amendment 2, Section 3 of
the Constitution, the ruling did not elicit a reaction, as more than two years
had passed since the challenged administrative regulations added to the
original presidential emergency decree. In contrast, the listed interpretations
concerning political disputes that originated during President Chen’s
two-term presidency, including the three cases that will be discussed in this
part, were more complicated than the constitutional issues in Interpretation
No. 543.47 Let us begin by taking a second look at the aforementioned
Interpretation No. 520.
As suggested above, Interpretation No. 520, by all appearances,
concerned whether the Administration had the unilateral power to selectively
execute the annual government budget approved by the Parliament. In
addition, the decision appeared to provide procedural guidance on the
solution to the then-existing political gridlock.48 After the TCC’s decision,
the Premier and the Parliament Speaker made a joint public statement that
the Power Plant construction would be immediately resumed. 49 Based on
these outward signs, the TCC appeared to have successfully resolved the
political deadlock between the Administration and the Parliament. Yet what
triggered Interpretation No. 520 was more than a disagreement over the
execution of an annual budget between the Administration and the

47
The formulation in Table 1 is an adaptation of the official English version of the Judicial Yuan
Interpretations.
48
Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 935–36, 947.
49
See Joyce Huang & Lin Chieh-yu, Government gives in on power plant, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 14,
2001), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/02/14/0000073591.
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Parliament. The growing political divisiveness following the inauguration
of President Chen underlay the confrontation, which provides an alternate
basis for analyzing Interpretation No. 520.
After winning the presidential election unexpectedly on March 18,
2000, then President-elect (and a member of the DPP) Chen Shui-bian soon
announced the formation of an all-inclusive “people’s government” and
suggested that Mr. Tang Fei, a long-time KMT member and four-star
general, would be his choice for the Premier. This proposal was not
received positively by the DPP’s supporters,50 while the Pan Blue did not
reject the idea of a “people’s government” outright.51 Aspiring to create
partisanship-free politics, President Chen appointed Mr. Tang as the Premier
when he was sworn in on May 20, while simultaneously rejecting the
KMT’s demand to increase ties with the DPP in the
Administration. 52 Initially the experiment of the “people’s government” was
well received by the public, and the Pan Green and Pan Blue managed to
maintain a working relationship.53 Yet signs emerged that an unbridgeable
divide existed between President Chen and Premier Tang over the Power
Plant controversy. With the divide widening, Premier Tang resigned on
October 3, 2000, ending Chen’s 137-day “people’s government”
experiment.54 To carry out his election pledge, Chen turned to his DPP
comrade Mr. Chang Chun-hsiung, who formed a minority Administration
and later announced the discontinuation of the Power Plant plan on October
27. 55 In reaction, the KMT decided to escalate the confrontation by
boycotting all of the government bills and threatening to recall Chen from

50
Liu Shao-Hua, Is the choice of Tang Fei a compromise too far?, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 31, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/03/31/0000030352.
51
Initially, the KMT was not opposed to the appointment of a KMT member as Premier, expecting
that it could dominate the Administration with its parliamentary majority. Yet President Chen was not
interested in forming a formal coalition Administration underpinned by an inter-party agreement. After
his rejection of a KMT-dominated Administration, the KMT’s attitude towards the Premier-designate Tang
gradually changed from reluctant acceptance to boycott. Lin Chieh-yu, DPP says Cabinet is not the place
for factionalism, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 31, 2000), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/03/
31/0000030350.
52
Irene Lin, Chen stands tough on Cabinet choices, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 1, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/04/01/0000030570.
53
Monique Chu, Poll gives Tang and Tsai high performance marks, TAIPEI TIMES (July 29, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/07/29/000004570
54
Joyce Huang & Lin Chieh-yu, Tang bows out with president’s blessing, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 4,
2000), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/04/0000055924.
55
Joyce Huang, Cabinet pulls plug on power plant, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 28, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/28/0000058926.
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office, virtually bringing the entire Government to a halt.56 Against the
backdrop of this heated partisan battle, the Administration referred the
dispute to the TCC.
It is true that the political gridlock was indeed unblocked after the
promulgation of Interpretation No. 520 on January 15, 2001. Nevertheless,
it fell far short of resolving the political issues underlying the constitutional
dispute. On January 31, the KMT-controlled Parliament resolved to
immediately resume the Power Plant construction by a vote of 135 to 70
with only a few abstentions, forcing the Administration to abandon President
Chen’s campaign pledge. 57 The working relationship between the KMT-led
Pan Blue and the DPP-led Pan Green was never restored, and the idea of
partisanship-free new politics was abandoned. Instead, as demonstrated by
subsequent cases, Interpretation No. 520 emboldened the parliamentary
majority KMT, who found a constitutional citadel in the Parliament in its
political confrontation with the DPP Government that would plunge the
constitutional order into constant turmoil.
It is no surprise that the Parliament was not the only theater of
partisan conflict during this period. Rather, after the KMT lost the
presidential election, the Taipei City Government (TCG) became another
rallying ground with Mr. Ma Ying-Jeou, who had unseated the
incumbent Chen Shui-bian in a landslide mayoral election in 1998, rising as
a counterweight to the DPP Government.58 Situated in this broad political
context, both Interpretations No. 550 and 553 concerned more than the
constitutional division of powers between the central government and the
local governments. On its surface, Interpretation No. 550 addressed whether

56
Lin Mei-chun, KMT moves to recall the president, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 31, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/31/0000059288.
57
Lin Mei-chun, Uncertainty hangs in the air after vote, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb 01, 2001),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/02/01/0000071850. The
Pan
Blue-sponsored
motion included the commitment to a nuclear power-free homeland in the future, which had been a
loner-term DPP plank. It was later included in the Environment Basic Law. Yet it left unaddressed the
timeline of phasing out the existing three nuclear power plants. It is also noteworthy that Interpretation No.
520 fell far short of settling the controversy over the Power Plant as it had been the flash point of political
conflict ever since, until the KMT Government decided to give up on its completion under the enormous
public pressure sparked by the former DPP leader Mr. Lin I-hsiung’s week-long hunger strike in April
2014. Shih Hsiu-chuan, Government will never axe plant: Jiang, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2001/02/01/0000071850.
58
Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations in a Contested Constitutional Democracy: The
Case of Taiwan, in CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN ASIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS 37, 50–51 (Andrew
Harding & Mark Sidel eds., 2015) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations].
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a statutory demand on local governments to make financial contributions to
the centrally administered national health insurance was constitutional. 59 In
Interpretation No. 553, the Administration’s revocation of a TCG decision to
postpone the statutorily scheduled election of its subordinate li executive
officers (borough wardens)60 was at issue.61 In the former, the TCC ruled
that the challenged statutory demand was constitutional, but it advised the
central government to consult local governments when imposing statutory
financial burdens on them in the future. In the latter, the TCC stated that the
Administration had the legal power to review the TCG’s decision in the
administration of its local elections, but did not address the legality of the
Administration’s revocation as the issue fell within the jurisdiction of
administrative courts. 62 Evidently, Interpretation No. 553 suggested the
TCC’s embrace of the Bickelian “passive virtues.”63 It is also noteworthy
that that the seemingly evasive Interpretation No. 553 was decided less than
three months after the promulgation of Interpretation No. 550, which
resulted in the TCG’s pursuance of further legal consideration as Ma was
seeking mayoral re-election in 2002. 64 Even though Ma had won a landslide
victory less than two weeks prior and the TCC invoked passive virtues,65

59
J.Y. Interpretation No. 550 (Const. Ct. Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno =550.
60
A li is a borough, whose elected executive officer, the warden, is the lowest-level official in the
statutory provision for the local self-government in Taiwan.
61
J.Y. Interpretation No. 553 (Const. Ct. Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno =553.
62
For a more complete summary of both interpretations, see Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local
Relations, supra note 58, at 51–53. The TCC has jurisdiction over the interpretation of constitutional
provisions and judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances, as well as the
impeachment of the President and the Vice President. Moreover, it is tasked with issuing so-called
“uniform interpretations” of statutes and ordinances. Over non-constitutional public law cases, the
Supreme Administrative Court has the final say. Criminal and civil law matters belong to the jurisdiction
of the so-called ordinary courts comprising a Supreme Court, several high courts, and dozens of district
courts. The TCC has no appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court and
the Supreme Court. See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformation, supra note 3, at 147–48.
63
The concept of passive virtues was made famous by Alex Bickel. In terms of counter-majoritarian
difficulty facing the judicial power, he argued that the court should avoid exercising its power of judicial
review by resorting to jurisdictional grounds when possible. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 199–200.
64
Editorial, Justices give Ma reason to shutter, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 6, 2002),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/10/06/0000171004. Rather than engaging in
dialogue with the central government, the TCG elected to fight a long legal battle, which ended in a
Supreme Administrative Court ruling in favor of the central government in 2009. But the TCG continued
to defy court rulings. In any event this issue was politically settled after Ma was elected President in
2008.
Shih Hsiu-chuan, Insurance debt to be resolved, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 9, 2009),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/09/2003450701.
65
See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations, supra note 58, at 53.
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Interpretation No. 553’s affirmation of the Administration’s power to review
the TCG’s decision further antagonized the TCG. 66 Eventually, the DPP
Administration was unable to recover the unpaid dues the TCG owed on the
national health insurance during Ma’s eight-year mayoral tenure.67
Read together, Interpretations No. 550 and No. 553 show the TCC’s
reluctance to interpose itself in the political chess game between Mayor
Ma’s TCG and President Chen’s Government, but it did not shy away from
taking a firm stand on constitutional principles. 68 Even so, the two
interpretations not only left the wounded relationship between the central
and the local governments unhealed, but also failed to resolve the issue at
hand as the TCG continued to ignore its statutory duty. If the case law
during President Chen’s first term suggests that the TCC continued shining
in the period between 2000 and 2004, would the TCC’s constitutional light
shine even brighter in the second half of Chen’s presidency when political
storm clouds were gathering? It is to this theme this article now turns.
2.

Standing Against Partisan Whirlwinds: 2004–2008

While political stand-off characterized the relationship between the
Pan Blue and the Pan Green during the first term of the DPP Government,
constitutional brinkmanship dominated the political landscape after
President Chen was re-elected by a razor-thin margin on May 20,
2004. Expecting an uphill battle in the lead-up to the presidential election,
President Chen in January 2004 decided to hold a parallel referendum under
the recently enacted Referendum Act, despite parliamentary
objections. 69 The thinking behind this controversial decision was to
galvanize the pro-independence Pan Green supporters by using a referendum
to remind voters of the DPP’s long-held goal of an independent Taiwan due
to its implications of self-determination. 70 Yet what made President Chen’s

66

Jimmy Chuang et al., Borough-warden vote not our concern, say justices, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 21,
2002), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/12/21/0000187995.
67
For a discussion, explanation, and summary of how this long-standing controversy ended, see Shih
Hsiu-chuan & Loa Iok-sin, DOH budget unlocked to pay health fees, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/18/2003491261.
68
But see Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations, supra note 58, at 52, 53.
69
Huang Tai-lin, Opposition calls referendum ‘illegal, a joke’, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan 18, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/01/18/2003091791.
70
The referendum included two questions, both of which only tenuously touched on Taiwan’s
political identity. While the referendum failed to pass the high threshold to be legally binding, it was seen
to have successfully mobilized the DPP’s supporters in the presidential election. See Mily Ming-Tzu Kao,
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re-election toxically divisive was an assassination attempt on the eve of the
presidential election (the so-called “3/19 Incident”) during which both
President Chen and his running mate were wounded. The DPP’s electoral
victory was attributed to the 3/19 Incident, as the party allegedly garnered a
substantial number of sympathy votes. Upon the completion of the
vote-counting process, the Pan Blue rejected the result and accused the DPP
of staging the assassination attempt, setting up a long battle that haunted
President Chen’s second term. 71 As part of its attempt to challenge the
legitimacy of President Chen’s presidency (which also included litigation
challenging the validity of the presidential election and mass protests), the
majority Pan Blue passed a special law that created an extraordinary
parliamentary investigative committee (EPIC), which was equipped with
broad prosecutorial powers to discover the “truth” of the 3/19
Incident. 72 This set the stage for the long tripartite constitutional saga
comprising of Interpretations No. 585, No. 601, and No. 633, which lasted
from 2004 to 2007 as President Chen’s second term was winding down.
No sooner had the law creating EPIC (EPIC Act) come into effect on
September 24, 2004 than the Pan Green MPs petitioned the TCC to issue an
injunctive order, arguing it encroached on the executive’s constitutional
powers. 73 The TCC did not respond to the plea for an injunction
immediately, and meanwhile the DPP Administration ordered all civil
servants to ignore any request or order from the EPIC. 74 On December 15,
the TCC promulgated Interpretation No. 585 (EPIC I), circumscribing the
scope of the parliamentary investigation vis-à-vis the executive privilege of
non-disclosure, and striking down several crucial provisions of the EPIC
Act. The EPIC investigation was immediately brought to a halt.75 Infuriated
by this ruling, the Pan Blue-controlled Parliament cut off the judicial
premium from the TCC Justices’ remuneration in January 2005 during the

The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?, 44 ASIAN SURV. 591,
593–95, 598 (2004).
71
Huang Tai-lin, Lien calls election unfair, demands a recount, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 21, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/03/21/2003107202.
72
Debby Wu & Ko Shu-ling, “Monstrous” bill horrifies Cabinet, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 25, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2004/08/25/2003200116.
73
J.Y. Interpretation No. 585 (Const. Ct. Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=585.
74
Jimmy Chuang, Officials cite law’s many anomalies, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 10, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/10/10/2003206280.
75
Jimmy Chuang, Court reduces powers of 319 committee, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 16, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/12/16/2003215297.
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non-statutory process of vetting the annual government budget. 76 This
blatant political revenge was unprecedented. Being a pecuniary dispute on
the surface, this non-statutory parliamentary move was a stern warning,
challenging the TCC’s judicial character.77 In response, the Pan Green MPs
petitioned the TCC shortly after and the TCC issued Interpretation No. 601
in response to this budget manipulation. The superficially technical change
to the annual government budget was invalidated outright not only for its
violation of the constitutional ban on any non-statutory reduction of the
remuneration of the judiciary, but also for its negative implications on
judicial independence.78
Pushed back by the TCC, the Pan Blue soon ceased its attack on the
TCC, but did not relent on its refutation of the legitimacy of Chen’s
presidency. Responding reluctantly to Interpretation No. 585, the Pan
Blue-dominated Parliament amended the condemned provisions of the EPIC
Act with the hope that the EPIC would be brought back to life in order to
prove that President Chen’s re-election was the work of the DPP’s political
machinations. 79 Interpretation No. 633 (EPIC II) was promulgated on
September 28, 2007, over sixteen months after the Pan Green referred the
amended EPIC Act to the TCC for its violation of the constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers. Although the TCC affirmed most of
the challenged provisions, it rendered the restructured EPIC effectively
impotent by invalidating the crucial stipulation that the EPIC had the power
to transfer civil servants to its command without the Administration’s
consent.80 It was no surprise that the Pan Blue subsequently accused the
activist TCC of taking sides with the Pan Green, but it took its partisan fight
to the electoral battleground as the parliamentary election was just
three-and-a-half months away. 81 Moreover, the Pan Blue sensed that the
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political winds were shifting, with the KMT-nominated Ma Ying-Jeou
emerging as the favorite in the next presidential election set to be held in less
than six months.82 Taken together, the TCC failed to resolve the controversy
resulting from the 2004 presidential election even with the resounding
constitutional trio of Interpretations No. 585, No. 601, and No. 633.
The partisan rivalry between the Pan Blue and the Pan Green
extended to the issue of controlling independent regulatory
agencies. Inspired by the United States’ experience with independent
regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), scholars of
communications in Taiwan had long advocated for the establishment of an
independent National Communications Commission (NCC). The NCC
would be tasked with regulating the telecommunications industry and
protecting mass media from falling under the sway of government
authorities (including the military) or political parties. 83 Yet when the
proposal to create the NCC was brought to the foreground, the political
landscape was increasingly partisan. Losing control of the Government, the
KMT intended to hold onto its remaining influence over mass media out of
fear that it might lose more ground to the Pan Green. Thus, control over the
prospective NCC became another contentious issue in the long partisan
struggle.
In 2005, as part of its comprehensive government reorganization plan,
the Administration introduced its legislative bill for the creation of the NCC
to Parliament. The DPP Administration and the Pan Green in the Parliament
clashed with the parliamentary majority Pan Blue over the NCC’s
formation. To secure its influence over mass media, the Pan Blue defeated
the FCC-inspired government bill and passed its own draft legislative bill.84
Under the Pan Blue-sanctioned NCC Act, the formation of the NCC, which
would comprise of thirteen commissioners, was essentially placed under the
parliamentary auspices. Basically, the appointment of the commissioners
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would proceed in three stages. In the first stage of recommendation, the
Administration could only recommend three candidates, while the
Parliament would make fifteen recommendations allocated in proportion to
the parliamentary seats each party held. Following the first stage, all
eighteen candidates would be subject to a vetting process overseen and
administered by a Parliament-appointed expert committee, whose eleven
appointees were again allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary
seats. Only after the second stage of vetting did the Premier’s constitutional
power of appointment come into play: in the third stage, which involved
multiple steps, the Premier would choose his nominees for the
commissionership from the vetted candidates and then sign the order of
appointment if his nominees received parliamentary consent.85 In all, this
process stripped the Premier of his influence over the membership of the
NCC as his appointment power, which lay at the core of the executive
power, was rendered nominal.
As was expected, the Administration referred the NCC Act to the
TCC, claiming the Act encroached upon the core executive power of
appointment, and requested an injunctive order in January 2006; the
formation of the first NCC had already begun according to the foregoing
procedure. 86 Corresponding to its approach to the controversy over the
EPIC, the TCC did not respond to the Administration’s plea for an
injunction. It was not until six months later that the TCC ruled against the
Parliament in Interpretation No. 613, declaring part of the NCC Act
unconstitutional.87 It is noteworthy that the TCC postponed the effect of its
declaration of unconstitutionality until the end of 2008, almost a year and a
half after the NCC Act was promulgated. It is true that the TCC frequently
postpones the effect of its declarations of unconstitutionality by setting a
time limit on the repeal of the disputed legislation.88 Still, in terms of the
immediate impact of the NCC on the regulation of mass media, it is
remarkable that the TCC set such a long time limit, as it allowed for the
NCC’s continuing operation beyond President Chen’s tenure. Moreover,
departing from its approach to setting a time limit in the case law, the TCC
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was explicit that the validity of all decisions taken by the “unconstitutional”
NCC would be unaffected.89 In result, Interpretation No. 613 acquiesced to
the Pan Blue’s sway over the constitutionality of the NCC, even though it
declared part of the NCC Act unconstitutional.
Notably, President Chen, his family, and many DPP officials had been
embroiled in a number of conspicuous scandals beginning in the second half
of 2005. When Interpretation No. 613 was promulgated in July 2006,
President Chen was already at the center of a series of corruption and
international money-laundering accusations, leading to the Red Shirt Army’s
mass protest in September. In light of this tumultuous political environment,
the unusual aspects of Interpretation No. 613 were an indication that the
TCC conceded fait accompli in the endgame of the DPP Government,
despite its ostensibly activist stance on constitutional principles. Acting on
the TCC-set timeframe, the Pan Blue could simply wait until after the
upcoming elections to reassert its active influence on the NCC in alternative
ways following its expected electoral wins.90 The political maelstrom that
engulfed the entire DPP Government also set the perfect stage for
Interpretation No. 627.
On the surface, Interpretation No. 627 primarily concerned the scope
of presidential immunity, as provided for in Article 52 of the Constitution,
and the so-called “state secrets privilege.” The underlying dispute was a
prosecutorial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and other
crimes against President Chen, First Lady Wu Shu-chen, and a number of
their aides. Article 52 stipulates that the sitting President shall not be subject
to any criminal prosecution, trial, or punishment for any crimes other than
treason.91 Yet it was unclear whether the sitting president was also immune
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from other criminal proceedings such as the pre-indictment prosecutorial
investigation implicating President Chen. Initially, he voluntarily subjected
himself to the prosecutorial investigation concerning the First Lady’s and
her alleged accomplices’ suspected crimes in mid-2006. However, when the
formal indictment issued on November 3, 2006 intimated President Chen’s
involvement, he questioned whether the prosecutor had subjected him to
constitutionally-forbidden criminal proceedings. 92 Moreover, President
Chen asserted the state secrets privilege and requested that the trial court
(the Taipei City District Court) suppress several seized documents offered as
evidence against the First Lady and her co-defendants. The privilege was
asserted despite the documents not being classified in accordance with the
State Secrets Protection Act. 93 As the trial continued, the Presidency
referred these issues to the TCC in January 2007,94 and later, in March,
requested an injunction on the trial of the First Lady and her
co-defendants.95
Again, the TCC did not respond immediately to the Presidency’s
request for injunctive relief. In mid-June, the TCC issued Interpretation No.
627 and ruled that an unwritten state secrets privilege could be inferred from
the president’s constitutional roles, such as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces and other executive roles, as the Presidency had contended.96
Moreover, the TCC suggested that what would be classified under the State
Secrets Protection Act was not coterminous with the scope of the
presidential state secrets privilege, but rather an instance thereof. 97
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Initially, this appeared to give President Chen significant leverage in
his legal battle. Moreover, echoing United States v. Nixon, 98 the TCC
conflated the common law evidentiary rule of the state secrets privilege with
the constitutional doctrine of the executive privilege, extending its
application beyond private litigation. 99 Nonetheless, beneath the surface of
the TCC’s decision creating an unwritten constitutional doctrine of a general
state privilege, the TCC also rendered an absolute privilege
justiciable. While the President was entitled to invoke this constitutional
“privilege” in the criminal proceedings, such a plea would be subject to
judicial review, even if the standard of scrutiny would be the less exacting
reasonableness review. 100 In other words, under Interpretation No. 627, the
President was only entitled to a qualified reviewable right, not a privilege
outright. 101 With no existing legal framework for reviewing state secrets
claims, the TCC stated that disputes over the President’s invocation of the
state secrets privilege in judicial proceedings would be heard by an ad hoc
tribunal of five sitting appellate judges convened with the Taiwan High
Court (THC). 102 Paralleling its assertion of judicial control of the state
secrets privilege, it interpreted Article 52 restrictively: except for the
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, prosecutors were prohibited
from naming the sitting President as a defendant, and thus the sitting
President was immune from any targeted investigation and other criminal
proceedings. 103 Notably, the latter stipulation did not apply to
pre-indictment prosecutorial investigations which could incidentally
implicate the sitting President in cases with others named as defendants. Yet
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this was exactly the case that prompted President Chen to bring a
constitutional challenge. 104
Ostensibly, Interpretation No. 627 seemed to strike a balance between
presidential executive power and the integrity of criminal proceedings by
stating constitutional principles. 105 To this end, it further provided for an
institutional framework within which the foregoing conflicting values could
be balanced in individual cases. However, the subsequent responses from
other constitutional actors rendered Interpretation No. 627 irrelevant. In the
immediate wake of Interpretation No. 627, President Chen pleaded with the
trial court to return the seized evidentiary documents, as they were protected
as state secrets. Receiving no response for over two months, he
retrospectively classified those documents according to the State Secrets
Protection Act in September 2007 and continued to request that the trial
court return them. In October, the trial court defiantly declared President
Chen’s retrospective classification unlawful and rejected his constitutional
claim of the state secrets privilege, in spite of the TCC’s ruling that such
claims be decided by an ad hoc tribunal of five sitting appellate judges with
the THC. 106 This decision added even more complexity to the legal saga,
which was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court on May 7, 2009 when it
affirmed a THC ruling issued by a three-judge panel in mid-February 2009:
Interpretation No. 627 was simply inapplicable. 107 By the time the Supreme

104

Rich Chang, Wu Indicted, supra note 92.
Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 899.
Rich Chang, Court rejects Chen’s request for return of documents, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/10/06/2003381908.
107
Following the trial court’s preliminary ruling on his state secrets claim, President Chen appealed
the ruling to the THC in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, resulting in a judicial ping-pong
between the Supreme Court and the THC: rescind and remand rulings, redeterminations, and
(re)appeals. To make a long story short, each issued four rulings on President Chen’s appeals. Notably, in
its first two rulings, the THC convened an ad hoc five-member tribunal to decide the claim in accordance
with Interpretation No. 627. Yet in its ruling on June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court revoked the THC’s
second ruling and remanded it to the THC with the instruction that the THC apply the Criminal Procedure
Code instead of the Interpretation No. 627-directed stopgap measure, as Chen’s retrospective classification
was unlawful and Interpretation No. 627 applied only to lawful claims of state secrets privilege.
Accordingly, the THC ruled against then ex-President Chen by a three-judge panel on July 14, 2008 when
Chen had already been under investigation. Chen continued to appeal even after President Ma’s
annulment of his decision to classify the evidentiary documents at issue. Although the Supreme Court
later rescinded and remanded the THC’s July 14, 2008 ruling for legal technicalities at the end of 2008, it
did not reopen the question of whether the THC should determine the claim with an ad hoc five-judge
tribunal as alluded to in Interpretation No. 627, or with an ordinary three-judge panel as provided for in the
Criminal Procedure Code. The THC ruled against Mr. Chen’s moot plea for returning the documents
concerned with a three-judge panel on February 16, 2009, a decision which was appealed again. The
105
106

JUNE 2016

Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics

623

Court issued its decision, Mr. Chen had stepped down almost one year
earlier and had already been taken into custody. 108 Four months later, he
was convicted on charges of corruption and other crimes. 109
The Supreme Court and the lower courts were not the only
constitutional actors that contributed to neutralizing Interpretation No.
627. While the TCC recognized presidential discretion by categorizing it
under the State Secrets Protection Act as an instance of the constitutional
state secrets privilege, the newly-inaugurated President Ma of the KMT
annulled his predecessor’s decision on secret classification in early August,
2008. 110 With regard to the legal framework governing the review of state
secretes claims to which the TCC alluded, the new Pan Blue-controlled
Parliament simply ignored this part of the TCC’s decision. The TCC may
have sung in unison in a maximalist style in Interpretation No. 627 as it tried
to step into the void with the stopgap institutional framework while working
to bring the three major constitutional powers together on the administration
of state secrets. 111 In light of subsequent developments, however,
Interpretation No. 627 only indicated how helpless the TCC was in the midst
of unrelenting partisan rivalry. 112
The last case decided during Chen’s Presidency examined by this
article, Interpretation No. 632, epitomizes the toxic partisanship present
throughout his second term. To begin with, it was promulgated in August
2007, when the DPP Government was plunged into the political whirlwinds
noted above, but the political dispute that led to the ruling could be traced
back to 2004, soon after President Chen was sworn in for his second
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term. 113 Under the Constitution, the Ombudsmanship (also known as the
Control Yuan), a collegiate body of twenty-nine ombudsmen, is one of the
five coordinate departments of constitutional powers alongside the
Presidency.
The Constitution provides that the President appoints
ombudsmen with parliamentary consent. 114 President Chen did not
nominate his choices for new ombudsmen until December 20, 2004, when
the Parliament returned to the lame-duck session after the parliamentary
election on December 11; the election had given the DPP the most seats but
delivered the Pan Blue parliamentary majority. 115 At that time, the end of
the Third Ombudsmanship (January 31, 2005) was only six weeks
away. Despite the tight timeline, the lame-duck Parliament deviated from
the parliamentary rules and put the nomination on hold until the end of the
parliamentary term on January 31, 2005. After the new Parliament opened
on February 1, President Chen re-sent his nomination on April 4, while the
ombudsmen had already left office for over two months. The Pan
Blue-controlled Parliament continued to hold the nomination by means of
parliamentary rules. To break the deadlock, the Pan Green MPs referred the
case to the TCC in June. 116
The TCC did not respond until August 2007, after the
Ombudsmanship had already been left defunct for over thirty months. In
Interpretation No. 632, the TCC declared that the Parliament’s deliberate
inaction amounted to a failure to carry out its constitutional duty. It also
noted that both the President and the Parliament should properly fulfill their
constitutional role by making a timely nomination and holding a vote
without deliberate delay concerning the Ombudsmanship. 117 While
Interpretation No. 632 stood firm on constitutional principles and even took
the parliamentary inaction to task, it stopped short of pointing a clear way
out of the political gridlock, such as by setting a deadline for an up-or-down
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vote. Because the TCC took over two years to reach its decision,
Interpretation No. 632 can barely be considered a testament to the TCC’s
effectiveness in settling political disputes, despite its normative stance on the
interdepartmental collaboration under the Constitution. Worse still, the
Parliament did not bother to respond to the TCC’s admonition at all.118 The
constitutional crisis of the defunct Ombudsmanship was not resolved until
August 1, 2008, when its vacancies were filled with President Ma’s
nominees. 119 It was over three-and-a-half years after the Third
Ombudsmanship closed.
In view of all the cases discussed in Part II.A., the TCC continued to
fulfill its constitutional role of guarding the constitutional order by setting
out normative principles and prescribing procedural guidelines on the
resolution of political disputes during the period from 2000 to 2008. 120 It is
also true that as the reasoning or dictum of some Interpretations suggests, the
TCC did try to adopt a more strategic stance to navigate through the political
storm without compromising the normativity of the constitution. 121
Nevertheless, looking beyond the Justices’ grandiose statements and
situating the case law in the context of partisan rivalry, the TCC’s record
during President Chen’s eight-year tenure only demonstrates the failure of
its activist approach in resolving political disputes in the heat of a
democratic civil war.
B.

An Irrelevant Court amid Escalating Constitutional Conflicts:
2008–2016

During the period of May 20, 2008 to March 31, 2016, there were
substantial changes in the personnel of the TCC. With President Chen’s
appointees gradually replaced by President Ma’s,122 the reconstituted TCC
departed from its predecessor’s activist approach to constitutional politics. It
rendered 94 interpretations in total, among which were four “uniform
interpretations.” 123 In other words, ninety-six percent of the TCC
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interpretations promulgated during this period concerned constitutional
disputes. Among the 90 constitutional interpretations, 87 concerned
fundamental rights. Only three resulted from political disputes:
Interpretations No. 645, 729, and 735. Before analyzing these three
interpretations, several features of the TCC’s case law during this period
should be noted.
First, there was an evident decline in productivity. During the
previous period, the TCC made approximately seventeen decisions
(constitutional and uniform) each year, whereas the number decreased to
approximately twelve per year after 2008. This downward development
indicates that the normative voice of the TCC on constitutional principles
was less likely to be heard. Second, the TCC paid more attention to
tax-related issues in this period than before, to the extent that the TCC could
be considered a tax court.124 This also suggests that the TCC focused more
on the protection of property than on political rights or civil liberties. In
terms of the technical character of tax law,125 the TCC’s self-transfiguration
into a tax court suggests its disinclination to hear controversial
issues. Third, with respect to the case law on important political disputes,
this period saw a steep fall from the previous one: from ten cases to
three. Considering the continuing escalation of constitutional conflicts,
these features, taken together, suggest that the TCC’s role in constitutional
politics became increasingly irrelevant. After drawing the TCC’s picture in
broad strokes, this article will now take up its case law to see if it fits into
the portrayal of an irrelevant court.
It is no surprise the first rulings on important political disputes in TCC
case law resulted from referrals or petitions made by the preceding
government, given the slow pace of judicial decision-making.
Interpretation No. 543, promulgated by the TCC during Chen’s presidency,
was such a case, as was Interpretation No. 645. The political landscape had
already seen tectonic changes between the date of referral and promulgation
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in both cases. Due to the gap between the time of referral and
promulgation, both interpretations bore little on their respective underlying
political disputes. Even so, the insignificance of Interpretation No. 543
inflicted no harm on the confident TCC because it had already promulgated
Interpretation No. 520 more than a year prior, setting the tone for an activist
court.126 In contrast, Interpretation No. 645 only reflected the continuing
decline of the TCC’s role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics in the
twenty-first century.
The legal issue at the center of Interpretation No. 645 was whether the
provision on the formation of the Referendum Review Committee (RRC) in
the Referendum Act of 2003 contravened the separation of powers
principle. Under that provision, the Premier was under a statutory duty to
appoint those nominated by the parliamentary caucuses while its
membership was allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary
seats.127 In light of the precedent set in Interpretation No. 613, the case was
relatively straightforward, with Interpretation No. 645 rendering the RRC
provision unconstitutional for depriving the Premier of the appointment
power with respect to the RCC,128 which was part of the administration of
referendum. The TCC thus declared the RRC provision unconstitutional and
set a one-year limit on its repeal. 129 However, taking into account the
political climate at the time, this ruling further evidences the TCC’s
declining role in constitutional politics.
As noted in Part II.A.2., the trouble in President Chen’s second term
stemmed from his votes-garnering stratagem: pairing a referendum to the
2004 presidential election. The Referendum Act at the center of
Interpretation No. 645 was forced through in December 2003 to pave the
way for holding the planned parallel referendum. Despite their status as the
parliamentary majority, the Pan Blue parties stopped short of killing the bill
for fear that doing so would backfire in the coming presidential
election. But, to minimize the impact of the prospective referendum and its
implications of self-determination, the Pan Blue inserted its own version of
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the RRC provision into the Referendum Act; the Pan Blue expected that the
RRC would filter out most citizen-initiated proposals for referendum, as all
proposals were subject to the RRC’s vetting.130 Furthermore, to ensure the
Pan Blue’s control over the RRC, it provided that its membership was to be
allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary seats and to be
effectively decided by the parliamentary caucuses.131 It was against this
backdrop of partisan calculation that the Pan Green MPs referred the RRC
provision to the TCC in early 2004, with the presidential election less than
three months away. Yet the TCC did not deliver its final judgment until July
2008.
It is beyond the scope of this article to pinpoint why the TCC failed to
deliver a timely response. Nevertheless, it is not a far-fetched suggestion
that had the TCC intervened in time, it could have borne heavily on the
political debate in early 2004, and even influenced the presidential
election. 132 Even if it would not have intervened in the holding of the
referendum and the presidential election, its ruling on the formation of the
RRC would have provided constitutional guidance on the controversy over
the NCC’s creation. As a result of the TCC’s failure to intervene in time,
however, it was Interpretation No. 613 that shed light on Interpretation No.
645. Moreover, when Interpretation No. 645 was promulgated in July 2008,
the Pan Blue had regained its domination of the political landscape, and
there had been five unsuccessful referendums since 2004. In terms of the
constitutional significance of the introduction of referendums to Taiwan, the
TCC had missed its opportunity to voice the constitutional principles
concerning referendums in the early stage. By the time it promulgated
Interpretation No. 645, it was too late.133 As it turned out, even the amended
RRC and new appointment procedures passed in 2009 suffered public
criticism for filtering out several citizen-initiated referendum proposals that
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were aimed at reversing the KMT Government’s China policy. 134 Instead of
prescribing constitutional principles guiding the relationship between the
executive and the legislative power in the intensified partisan politics,
Interpretation No. 645 reflected the TCC’s irrelevance after 2008.
After Interpretation No. 645 was decided in 2008, the TCC did not
decide another important political dispute for seven years. On the surface,
Interpretation No. 729 concerned the scope of parliamentary investigative
power with respect to documents held by the Administration.135 It resulted
from a referral by the Administration at the behest of the Supreme
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) in late November 2013, which disputed the
parliamentary request for the dossier of a criminal investigation on October
29 on the grounds that it encroached on the core of the executive
power.136 The TCC did not respond until May 1, 2015 when it promulgated
Interpretation No. 729. Referring to the EPIC I interpretation, the TCC ruled
that the dossier of an ongoing case was off-limits to the Parliament, and
restrictively delineated the parliamentary investigative power concerning
closed cases. 137 Read on its own, Interpretation No. 729 appeared to be
another instance of the TCC’s attempts to rein in an uncontrolled
Parliament. A different picture emerges, however, when the case is read in
light of its root cause: the disputed parliamentary request.
The parliamentary request in question was made when the Parliament
was debating private member bills in a proposed amendment of the
Communications Privacy Act (CPA), which was prompted by a wiretapping
scandal in a high political drama. 138 At the heart of this political drama was
the long-term political antagonism between President Ma and his KMT rival
Mr. Wang Jin-pyng, the Speaker of the Parliament, with other supporting
actors, including Prosecutor General Mr. Huang Shi-ming and the DPP whip
Mr. Ker Chien-ming. The Parliament was prompted into action as a result of
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Mr. Huang’s briefing to President Ma in September 2013. Acting on that
briefing, President Ma, in his capacity as the KMT Chair, publicly referred
the Speaker to the KMT disciplinary committee for his alleged attempt to
unduly influence a criminal investigation implicating Mr. Ker by lobbying
the Minister of Justice. 139 This referral could have led to the loss of Mr.
Wang’s parliamentary seat. 140 Thus, not only were both President Ma and
Prosecutor General Huang accused of corrupting the integrity of the SPO,
which was supposed to stay clear of political influence, but their
collaboration was also seen as a plot to bring down the Speaker.141
Beneath these concerns is another disturbing fact: the charge against
the Speaker was based on the transcript of a wiretap that had received a
court warrant for a different case in 2010. Based on the 2010 warrant and its
continuous renewals issued under the CPA, the SPO extended its wiretap
dragnet to include the official phone lines of Parliament.142 Accusing the
SPO of unlawfully wiretapping and intruding on parliamentary privileges,
MPs moved to request the case dossier concerning the wiretapping of the
Speaker, not only to expose the wayward SPO; the requested dossier was
also thought to be potentially informative for the amendment under
consideration.143
Read in light of this backdrop, Interpretation No. 729 was the opposite
of what the TCC suggested. Instead of an uncontrolled Parliament intent on
interfering with the prosecution of criminalities, it was the SPO that had run
amok. Removed from this political context, the TCC seemed to let the SPO
avoid punishment and took the Parliament to task seventeen months after the
wiretapping scandal broke. In the meantime, the SPO did not escape from
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the Parliament’s wrath. Receiving no response from the TCC, the
Parliament simply resorted to “self-help”: the amendment was passed in late
January 2014 with the SPO’s capacity to conduct wiretapping substantially
curtailed.144 Although the legislative self-help seemed to suggest that the
TCC’s late intervention made room for the political branches to work out
their differences, this was simply an unsubstantiated perception. Had the
TCC spoken on the matter in time, Interpretation No. 729 would have been
easily read in context. The Interpretation would not have been read to
describe the immaculate SPO fighting the unruly parliamentary intervention
for the integrity of criminal investigation and for the protection of
communications privacy. Moreover, the legislative reaction, unguided by
constitutional principles, only plunged the executive-legislative relationship
into a downward spiral and cast doubt on the ill-considered
amendment. 145 Interpretation No. 729 was another clear example of the
TCC willingly turning into an irrelevant spectator of a triangular
constitutional play among the President, the SPO (nominally attached to the
Administration), and the Parliament.
Less than three weeks after the historical elections on January 16,
2016,
the TCC promulgated Interpretation No. 735. In line with its
post-2008 practices, the TCC spoke only after the controversy had already
been resolved. While Interpretation No. 735 expanded upon the
constitutional provision for the vote of no confidence (Amendment 3,
Section 2, clause 3) and ruled that the statutory restriction on the motion of
no confidence during a special parliamentary session was
unconstitutional,147 the underlying cause of its referral was the Pan Green’s
no-confidence motion against the Administration on July 25, 2012. 148
Again, the time lag exposes the TCC’s lethargy. Yet Interpretation No. 735
itself is the culmination of constitutional anomalies in the midst of declining
constitutional influence.
146
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The first anomaly concerns the Administration’s unusual tenure. As a
consequence of a controversial rescheduling of the presidential election,149
President Ma was re-elected in January 14, 2012, although he would not be
sworn in for his second term until May 20. In the meantime, he had
appointed a new Premier, Sean Chen, in early February when he was still
serving his first term. Three-and-a-half months later, Premier Chen was
reappointed as President Ma officially began his second term. 150 Yet, at that
time, Premier Chen’s Administration was already embroiled in various
policy controversies, including the intractable issues surrounding the
proposed lifting of a ban on the importation of American beef, on which
domestic politics and foreign relations were intertwined. 151 Premier Chen
was even unprecedentedly prevented from fulfilling his constitutional duty
to introduce his general policy statement before the Parliament within the
statutorily prescribed timeline by the combative Pan Green. 152
The second anomaly was the opposition Pan Green’s inconsistent
constitutional moves. By the end of the regular parliamentary session in
mid-June, it continuously boycotted the Administration but fell short of a
motion of no confidence. Pan Green’s introduction of the July 25
no-confidence motion was not a result of Premier Chen’s policies, but rather
the Administration Chief of Staff’s corruption scandal in late June when the
KMT caucus had moved to convene a four-day special parliamentary session
to address many unresolved issues from July 24 to 27. 153 Acting under the
statute governing the exercise of the legislative power, however, the Speaker
rejected the Pan Green’s no-confidence motion against Premier Chen
outright as it was not on the predetermined legislative agenda of the special
session. 154 Intriguingly, the Pan Green MPs waited almost two months to
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refer the relevant statutory provisions to the TCC on September 17, after the
new ordinary session had already begun.155 More baffling was that the Pan
Green introduced a new no-confidence motion against Premier Chen the
next day, which was defeated on September 22.156 In other words, with its
own move on September 18, the Pan Green effectively rendered its referral
to the TCC moot.
Even so, the TCC delivered Interpretation No. 735 three-and-a-half
years after the referral, when the curtain was being drawn on the KMT
Government and the new Parliament had already opened. This is the third
anomaly. Removed from its convoluted political context, the terse
Interpretation No. 735 reads like an entry on the motion of no confidence in
a treatise on constitutional law. It may be praised for its liberal
interpretation of the parliamentary power to introduce no-confidence
motions in both the regular and special parliamentary sessions. 157 But when
it came to the TCC’s real-world influence, Interpretation No. 735 epitomized
the TCC’s irrelevance to political disputes as they had gradually found
settlement outside the judicial channel in the years preceding it, a theme to
which Part III will turn shortly.
Taken together, the TCC’s reluctance to give voice to the constitution
during the studied period, especially when it came to controversial issues,
resulted in its irrelevance to the development of constitutional politics. If the
activist TCC was the linchpin of the judicialization of politics, which
underlay the growth of constitutionalism in Taiwan’s democratic transition,
the TCC’s disappearance from the political landscape after 2008 clearly
indicates the turn to de-judicialization. To be sure, this may suggest a move
from legal or judicial constitutionalism to political constitutionalism. 158 Yet,
in terms of escalating constitutional conflicts and political paralysis in this
period, the constitutional politics that resulted from de-judicialization did not
seem to correspond to what political constitutionalists would have been fond
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of. If it is not political constitutionalism, then what is it? Part III will try to
answer this question.
III.

W(H)ITHERS THE CONSTITUTION: FROM JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
TO CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS?

As the preceding analysis has shown, the TCC has been gradually
losing its normative grip on constitutional politics since 2000. If
constitutional politics work in a way in which constitutional principles are
carried out through political dynamics taking place outside judicial channels,
it means that the constitution continues to thrive in the face of the abatement
of judicial activism. It may thus be argued that Taiwan has bid farewell to
judicial constitutionalism while the normative constitution keeps shining
even brighter under political constitutionalism. 159 Yet the problem is that
while the constitutional order in Taiwan may be moving out of such judicial
channels, the political landscape has not become a fertile ground for the
Constitution, but rather turned into an unconstrained battlefield of unruly
partisan politics.
The foremost example of the Constitution’s weakening grip on the
political order is that the Constitution has been invisible on the most
important constitutional issue—the relationship between Taiwan and China
(also known as the “cross-strait relationship”)—since the TCC began to
retreat from the stage of constitutional politics. 160 Because Taiwanese
society has long been divided on its political relationship with
China—independence or union—whether to build stronger bilateral relations
has been the most sensitive subject on the political agenda.161 Apart from
the strategic choice between further economic and political union or ultimate
independence, the parliamentary role in the Government’s dealings with
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China has been at the center of political debates. With a series of bilateral
agreements signed and their impact percolating through numerous aspects of
everyday life in the first two years of President Ma’s first term, the calls for
more robust parliamentary oversight of Taiwan-China relations became
stronger. This issue came to a head when the Cross-Straits Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the equivalent of a free trade
agreement, was signed in June 2010 due to fears that it would set an
irreversible course towards further economic integration and ultimately
political union.162
One of the primary issues motivating the ECFA debate was whether it
required parliamentary approval. While the KMT Government contended
that it did not and would come into force if it received no up-or-down vote
from the Parliament within three months, the opposition Pan Green insisted
that it required legislative ratification and the Parliament had the right to
revise its content. 163 Although it received parliamentary approval in
mid-August, the constitutional question as to the parliamentary oversight of
the Taiwan-China relations was left unanswered. On the other hand, even if
it was passed (despite the Pan Green objection), its contents were still
controversial and continued to raise constitutional concerns. 164 Notably,
even before both sides of the Taiwan Strait formally signed the ECFA,
several proposals had been initiated to block it by referendum. Yet none of
them passed the RRC’s vetting, calling the constitutional status of the RRC
in implementing referendums into question again.165 It is also noteworthy
that petitions for the TCC to intervene and exercise judicial review of the
RRC decision by the administrative courts were also considered.166
To be clear, there is a clear distinction between the constitutional
question of the parliamentary oversight of Taiwan-China relations and the
issues surrounding the reconstituted RRC and its vetting procedures: the
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former concerns the separation of powers between the Parliament and the
Government, whereas the latter resulted from individual political
rights. Nevertheless, beneath this doctrinal distinction was a fundamental
issue concerning Taiwan’s political future. It was the existential question of
Taiwan as a constitutional polity that was at the root of the various attempted
constitutional petitions. Without going into detail about the reasons why
the TCC failed to intervene, it should be noted that this fundamental political
issue and its derivatives were fought outside of institutional channels and its
impact on constitutional politics would be felt beyond the ECFA itself.
Soon after the ECFA was ratified, further negotiations on the
liberalization of service sectors began in February 2011 and the resulting
“Cross-Straits Service Trade Agreement” (STA) was formally signed in June
2013. 167 As its impact on economy and society was expected to be even
broader and deeper than the ECFA, it elicited strong objections from
citizens, political groups, and the media. 168 Viewing the STA as the
cornerstone of his policy to move Taiwan even closer to China, however,
President Ma and his Government threatened that the STA would come into
force if the Parliament failed to give the STA an up-or-down vote within
three months. 169 Thus, the unanswered constitutional question as to the
parliamentary role in the dealings with China came to the surface again.
Moreover, Speaker Wang of the Parliament, President Ma’s long-time
political rival, sympathized with public concerns and delayed parliament
passing the STA by subjecting it to close legislative scrutiny. 170 At this
juncture, the issue of the parliamentary role in the Taiwan-China relations
was intertwined with political vendettas. The Speaker’s parliamentary
maneuver was considered the root cause of President Ma’s surprising move
to unseat him in September 2013. 171 Seen in this light, the constitutional
question as to the parliamentary role in the Taiwan-China relations was not
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resolved by judicial means. Nor was it settled in political channels under the
guidance of constitutional principles. Instead, it was addressed by
anti-constitutional political stratagems underpinned by a series of
constitutionally dubious wiretapping and palace politics. 172
Determined to push the STA through Parliament, President Ma, again
in his capacity as KMT Chair, gave orders to the KMT MPs to close the
parliamentary debate on the STA despite street demonstrations and the
parliamentary reaction to his failed political maneuverer against the
Speaker.173 When the STA was forced through the committee stage on
March 17, 2014, it immediately provoked mass protests, leading to the
occupation of the Parliament Building the next day. 174 At this point,
constitutional order was on the verge of breakdown. Although constitutional
order did not fail and the STA was shelved for the time being,175 the fact
that the constitutional dispute over the Parliament’s role in the
Taiwan-China relations culminated in the three-week occupation of the
Parliament Building reflected the withering of the Constitution in the move
towards de-judicialization. 176
The relationship between Taiwan and China was not the only issue
that was fought extra-constitutionally. The unprecedented decision to move
the conventional presidential election day from March 20 (or the preceding
or ensuing Saturday) ahead to January 14, 2012 was another example of raw
politics unbound by the Constitution in the midst of de-judicialization.
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the beginning and
end of a presidential term or the date of a presidential election, it had been a
settled convention until 2011 that the election should be held on the
preceding or ensuing Saturday of March 20 of the election year and then the
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President should be sworn in on May 20.177 In terms of the impact of an
electoral calendar on a campaign and even election results, the idea of
moving the election day two months ahead was extraordinary and
controversial when it was first proposed in 2010.178 Under the pretext of
saving administrative costs by holding the 2012 presidential election on the
same day as the next parliamentary election, which must take place in
mid-January at the latest, this extraordinary proposal was regarded as part of
the KMT’s political maneuvering for its own gain. Considering President
Ma’s low approval ratings, the opposition believed that he could benefit
from the KMT MP candidates who were seen as commanding grassroots
political support if the presidential and parliamentary elections were held on
the same day. 179
When the Central Election Commission (CEC)–an independent
agency within the Administration responsible for the administration of
elections, including the selection of election dates–took up this proposal in
early 2011, serious concerns were raised. 180 In addition to the election
date’s impact on the elections, it also raised concerns over thousands of new
voters being excluded from the voter register. 181 But the more concerning
problem was that it would double the length of the interval between the
presidential election day and the inauguration day, 182 increasing government
instability and the political risk inherent during the so-called “presidential
transition.”183 In terms of its deviation from the established constitutional
convention and its grave consequences for the entire constitutional order, it
was argued that a constitutional amendment would be required to change
constitutional conventions regarding the presidential election date.184
Immediate reactions to the CEC’s decision on April 19, 2011 that both
the presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held on January 14,
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2012 were angry, strongly condemning the CEC’s submission to the ruling
KMT. 185 Calls for the TCC’s intervention were also voiced.186 Yet the
vociferous criticisms of this anti-constitutional political gambit were
eventually drowned out by boisterous campaign rhetoric as both the KMT
and the DPP shifted attention from the constitutional argument to the
judgment of the election day. President Ma won a landslide re-election on
January 14, 2012, and the issue of a deliberately extended presidential
transition and its potential constitutional crisis seems to have become a moot
point for the time being.
In light of the election result, the change of the presidential election
date may be interpreted as an instance of extra-constitutional amendment
instead of anti-constitutional action. The problem is that this action neither
enhanced the government’s stability nor strengthened the fundamental right
to vote. Its only consequence was to establish precedent that a self-created
lengthened period of the presidential transition is no longer inconceivable
under the Constitution. Notably, this prophesy was fulfilled on January 16,
2016 when the DPP presidential candidate Ms. Tsai Ing-wen defeated the
KMT, igniting calls for shortening the term of President Ma’s lame-duck
presidency by legislation to minimize the constitutional risk inherent in the
extended presidential transition.187
In sum, the controversies over the parliamentary role in the
Taiwan-China relationship and the presidential election date illustrate
declining constitutional normativity, with the TCC retreating from the
constitutional stage. As it turns out, what has taken the place of judicial
constitutionalism is untamed constitutional politics that work against the
ideal of political constitutionalism and thus withers the normative
constitution.
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CONCLUSION

This article has argued that, contrary to the popular view among TCC
scholars that the TCC has continued to be an activist and authoritative player
in constitutional politics, the influence of the TCC has been waning since
2000. The decline of the TCC cannot be attributed to shifting judicial
philosophy alone. As the TCC case law during President Chen’s eight-year
tenure indicates, the TCC remained an activist court, although it failed to be
an effective constitutional player. The TCC did not become more active
after the KMT’s return to power in 2008. Reluctant to give voice to
constitutional principles, the TCC became less and less relevant to
constitutional politics. Unfortunately, what has accompanied this move
towards the de-judicialization of politics has not been robust political
constitutionalism aimed at the implementation of constitutional norms
outside the judicial channel. Instead, looming from the political landscape
where the TCC has been invisible is an unconstrained politics that plays
with, instead of playing by, the Constitution. Thus, although the TCC has
remained the ordained interpreter of constitutional norms, constitutional
normativity has been chipped away on its watch. With judicial
constitutionalism displaced by untamed constitutional politics, the TCC is
reduced to a nominal court while the Constitution withers.
Juxtaposed with its record during the twentieth century, the TCC’s
overall performance in the twenty-first century tells us that a constitutional
court is not a master of politics, but rather thrives or withers in the delicacy
of constitutional politics. Taiwan’s political landscape is shifting again. The
DPP and its candidate Ms. Tsai significantly outperformed the KMT in both
the presidential and parliamentary elections on January 16, 2016. The
DPP’s electoral victory is historical. Not only did its candidate win the
presidency by a wide margin, but it also became the majority party in the
Parliament for the first time. 188 The long-time political behemoth KMT has
been plunged into intense infighting ever since. 189 Constitutional
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discussions abound in this new political landscape.190 At the dawn of a new
political era, it remains to be seen whether the TCC will be able to reclaim
its past glory by reinvigorating the withered Constitution.
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